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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Aman Farah Gas appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of battery with the intent to commit rape.  On appeal, Gas 
claims the district court erred because it instructed the jury on battery with the 
intent to commit rape as an included offense of rape.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. R.G went to a friend’s house.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 
331, Ls. 2-9.)  R.G. then called a friend, Adichek Dwivdei (“Adi”), and went over 
to his house.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 332, L. 11 – p. 333, L. 16.)  R.G. then returned to 
her friend’s house at approximately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 20 
– p. 334, L. 7.)  Everyone was drinking alcohol.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 334, Ls. 6-19.)   
Eventually R.G. fell asleep on the couch in her friend’s living room.  
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 334, L. 19 – p. 335, L. 2.)  While she was asleep, someone, later 
identified as Gas, inserted his fingers in her rectum.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 335, Ls. 18-
25, p. 342, L. 23 – p. 343, L. 13.)  R.G. explained:  
Q. What happened? 
 
A. Well, I woke up to being messed with.  I didn’t really realize 
what was going on.  I was still kind of in that drunken, dream state, 
I guess.  And I was being fingered in the butt at that point.  And 
didn’t really realize it, you know.  I’d swung my arm out to kind of 
bat away.  I didn’t look or anything.  I was laying on my right side.  
 
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 335, Ls. 18-25.)  Gas also put his fingers in [R.G’s] mouth.  
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 335, L. 18 – p. 336, L. 15, Tr., p. 350, L. 25 – p. 351, L. 5.)  
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When R.G. swung her arm to “bat away” she did not hit anything, so she 
thought she could be dreaming and rolled back over.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 336, Ls. 
16-21.)  R.G. then felt her pants being slowly pushed down.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 337, 
Ls. 15-21.)  R.G. heard and felt Gas try to use his spit as lubrication.  (5/20/14 
Tr., p. 337, L. 22 – p. 338, L. 4.)  R.G. started to fully wake up when Gas tried 
three times to penetrate her rectum with his penis.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 336, L. 22 – 
p. 337.)   
Q. And at that point thought you were dreaming, went back to 
sleep? 
 
A. Um-hum.  Um, I was then woken up by him actually trying to 
penetrate me.  But he did try about three times to get his penis into 
my butt.  
 
Q. Now when you say, I guess, “penetrate,” you – what do you 
mean?  What could you feel? 
 
A. Um, the head of the penis trying to go into my rectum. 
 
Q. And that happened how many times? 
 
A. About three. 
 
Q. And how did it feel? 
 
A. It hurt.  It woke you up.  
 
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 336, L. 22 – p. 337, L. 9.)  R.G. turned around and saw it was 
Gas who was raping her.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 342, L. 23 – p. 343, L. 13.)  R.G. then 
got off the couch, pulled up her pants and locked herself in the bathroom.  
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 337, L. 10 – p. 338, L. 16.)  When R.G. got to the bathroom she 
wiped and saw blood on the toilet paper.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 338, Ls. 7-22.)  R.G. 
realized she had been anally raped.  (Id.)   
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R.G. stayed locked in the bathroom until her friend got up.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 
338, L. 23 – p. 339, L. 5.)  R.G. then grabbed her friend’s phone and R.G. locked 
herself back in the bathroom.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 339, Ls. 1-22.)  R.G. posted frantic 
messages on Facebook asking for someone to come help her and give her a 
ride.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 339, L. 16 – p. 342, L. 1; Ex. 1.)   
Richard Sammons, R.G.’s father, responded.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 342, Ls. 2-
22.)  R.G. told him that she had been anally raped and she wanted to go home.  
(Id.)  Eventually R.G. was picked up by another friend and her father.  (5/20/14 
Tr., p. 347, L. 18 – p. 348, L. 4.)  By then, R.G.’s father had already called the 
police.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 348, Ls. 5-8.)  The police arrived and R.G. went to the 
Portneuf Medical Center, where she was examined.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 349, L. 1 – 
p. 350, L. 12.)  When Gas was interviewed by the police, he claimed he had 
been at a bar from approximately 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. and denied having any 
physical contact with R.G. upon his return to the residence.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 537, 
L. 5 – p. 538, L. 13, p. 550, L. 18 – p. 551, L. 10; 5/21/14 Tr., p. 689, Ls. 2-13.)   
The state charged Gas with rape under Idaho Code § 18-6101(6)(a) 
and/or (b).1  (R., pp. 74-75.)  Specifically, the charging document alleged: 
That the said AMAN FARAH GAS, County of Bannock, State of 
Idaho, on or about the 20th day of January, 2013, did penetrate 
with his penis the anal opening of a female person, [R.G.], who at 
the time was unconscious of the nature of the act and this was 
known to the defendant. 
 
                                            
1 I.C. § 18-6101 was amended in 2016.  Subsection (6) was re-designated as 
subsection (7) and the term “she” was amended to “the victim.”  The opening 
paragraph was amended to remove the words “the perpetrator’s” and “with a 




(R., pp. 74-75.)   
At trial, Ann Wilcox, a registered nurse at Portneuf Medical Center, 
testified that she examined R.G in the early morning hours shortly after the rape.  
(5/20/14 Tr., p. 569, Ls. 3-24, p. 585, Ls. 5-23.)  Ms. Wilcox observed and 
documented three separate tears in R.G.’s anus.  (5/20/14 Tr., p. 586, L. 20 – p. 
593, L. 17; Exs. 5, 6, 7, 14-16.)   
The state put on evidence that the Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
Laboratory tested DNA samples, including samples taken from Gas and R.G. 
(5/21/14 Tr., p. 854, Ls. 6-20.)  The lab tested a penile swab taken from Gas.  
(5/21/14 Tr., p. 865, Ls. 10-25.)  The lab found R.G.’s DNA on the sample taken 
from Gas’ penis.  (Id.)   
The district court proposed jury instructions, which included a lesser 
included offense.  (5/22/14 Tr., 1101, L. 2 – p. 1107, L. 9.)  Gas objected to the 
battery with the intent to commit rape instruction, arguing “we do not have the 
lesser or included offenses because the act has been completed in one 
continuous event” and, Gas claimed, it was prejudicial and violated his 
constitutional rights.  (5/22/14 Tr., p. 1102, L. 25 – p. 1103, L. 8, p. 1124, L. 1 – 
p. 1125, L. 5; see also R., pp. 486-487.)  After argument, the district court held, 
based in part on the comments accompanying the Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions, that battery with intent to commit rape is an included offense of a 
charge of rape.  (5/22/14 Tr., p. 1126, Ls. 2-10.)  The district court also held that 
the jury should be instructed on the included offense because there was 
evidence from which the jury could determine that Gas attempted to penetrate 
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R.G.’s anal opening, but was unsuccessful.  (5/22/14 Tr., p. 1102, L. 25 – p. 
1106, L. 2, p. 1125, L. 10 – p. 1127, L. 15.)   
THE COURT:  So the jury could say, well, we don’t believe he 
actually penetrated, but we believe that he attempted to do so on 
two occasions.  And that’s – that may have constituted the battery.  
And that would be an included offense under the standard 
instructions.  That’s a valid point.  
 
(5/22/14 Tr., p. 1105, L. 22 – p. 1106, L. 2.)   
The jury acquitted on the rape charge but found Gas guilty of battery with 
intent to commit rape.  (5/22/14 Tr., p. 1197, Ls. 15-25; R., p. 560.)  The district 
court denied Gas’ post-trial motions.  (See R., pp. 1076-1128.)  As part of its 
memorandum denying Gas’ post-trial motions, the district court again noted that 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 970 states that “‘[B]attery with intent to commit 
rape is an included offense of rape and can be shown by proof of all the 
elements of rape except penetration.’”  (R., pp. 1097-1098 (quoting ICJI 970 
(emphasis omitted); State v. Bolton, 119 Idaho 846, 810 P.2d 1132 (Ct. App. 
1991).)  The district court held: 
By applying the analysis used in Bolton, and the pattern instruction 
approved by the Idaho Supreme Court, it is clear that the included 
instruction here was properly given. 
 
(R., p. 1098.)  The district court also rejected Gas’ claim that instructing the jury 
on battery with intent to commit rape created a variance between the jury 
instruction and the charging document.  (R., pp. 1099-1100.)  The district court 
held: 
As explained above, the manner or means by which 
Defendant was alleged to have committed the rape was through 
penile/anal penetration.  Necessarily included in this contention, is 
the allegation that Defendant committed a battery upon the victim 
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by the actual, intentional and unlawful touching of the victim against 
her will. Thus, the means test articulated in Day is met here and no 
variance occurred. Additionally, because the battery was the 
necessary means by which the rape was attempted, Defendant 
was on sufficient notice of the charge.  Furthermore, the battery 
with intent to commit rape instruction was given as an included 
crime, and Defendant was never at risk of being placed in double 
jeopardy. Thus, even if there were a variance, no harm can be 
shown. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the 
jury was properly instructed as to the included offense of battery 
with intent to commit rape.   
 
(R., p. 1100 (citing State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479, 299 P.3d 788, 791 
(Ct. App. 2013) (review denied May 3, 2013).)   
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Gas to ten years with 
four years fixed.  (R., pp. 1135-1140, 1142-1147.)  Gas timely appealed. 






Gas states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err by instructing the jury on battery with the 
intent to commit rape?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Gas failed to show the district court erred when it determined that 
battery with the intent to commit rape is an included offense of rape?   
 





The District Court Correctly Instructed The Jury On Battery With Intent To 
Commit Rape As An Included Offense Of Rape 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Gas with rape.  (R., pp. 74-75.)  The district court held 
that battery with the intent to commit rape is an included offense of rape.  
(5/22/14 Tr., p. 1102, L. 25 – p. 1106, L. 2, p. 1125, L. 10 – p. 1127, L. 15.)  On 
appeal, Gas argues that battery with the intent to commit rape is not an included 
offense of rape where the victim was unconscious, and if it is an included 
offense, instructing the jury on battery with intent to commit rape nevertheless 
created a variance under the facts of this case.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-16.)  
Gas’ arguments are without merit.  Even when the victim is unconscious, rape 
still requires penetration – which is necessarily a battery – and thus all of the 
elements of battery with the intent to commit rape are included within the rape 
charge.  Further, the instruction of an included offense did not create a variance.  
The district court did not err.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether a particular crime is considered an included offense is a question 
of law over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 
525, 527, 261 P.3d 519, 521 (2011) (citing State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 
668, 946 P.2d 628, 630 (1997)). 
Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury 
instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are also 
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questions of law given free review on appeal.  State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 
57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Instructed The Jury On Battery 
With Intent To Commit Rape 
 
On appeal, Gas argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury 
on battery with intent to commit rape for two reasons: “1) it is not a lesser 
included offense of rape where the alleged victim is unconscious of the nature of 
the act; and 2) it created a variance between the charging document and the jury 
instruction.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  Both of Gas’ arguments are without merit.   
 
1. Battery With The Intent To Commit Rape Is An Included Offense 
Of Rape  
 
 The district court correctly held that battery with the intent to commit rape 
is an included offense of rape.  “‘There are two theories under which a particular 
offense may be determined to be a lesser-included offense of a charged 
offense’: the statutory theory and the pleading theory.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, __, 368 P.3d 621, 624 (2016), (quoting State v. Sanchez–Castro, 157 
Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014); State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 
944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)).  “The statutory theory provides that ‘one offense is 
not considered a lesser-included of another unless it is necessarily so under the 
statutory definition of the crime.’”  Id. (quoting Sanchez–Castro, 157 Idaho at 
648, 339 P.3d at 373; State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433, 614 P.2d 970, 
973 (1980)).  Under the statutory theory, a.k.a. the Blockburger test, “an offense 
may be a lesser-included of another if all the elements of the lesser offense are 
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included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater 
offense.”  Id. (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); State v. 
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114, 594 P.2d 149, 152 (1979)).  “Thus, an offense 
is not lesser-included if it is possible to commit the greater offense without 
committing the lesser.”  Id. 
 All of the elements of battery with the intent to commit rape are included 
within the elements of rape.  It is not possible to commit rape without committing 
battery with the intent to commit rape.  Rape requires the “penetration” of the 
victim’s “oral, anal or vaginal opening” with the perpetrator’s penis. 
I.C. § 18-6101(6) (2013).2   
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal 
or vaginal opening with the perpetrator’s penis accomplished with a 




(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the 
act. As used in this section, “unconscious of the nature of 
the act” means incapable of resisting because the victim 
meets one (1) of the following conditions: 
 
(a) Was unconscious or asleep; 
 
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that 
the act occurred. 
 
I.C. § 18-6101(6) (2013).  Any battery committed with the intent to commit rape is 
a violation of Idaho Code § 18-911 and is considered a battery with the intent to 
commit a serious felony.  A battery is defined as: 
                                            
2 As noted above, I.C. § 18-6101 was amended in 2013 and subsection (6) was 
re-designated as subsection (7).   
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(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another; or 
 
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another 
person against the will of the other; or 
 
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. 
 
I.C. § 18-903.  Rape requires a penile penetration.  See I.C. § 18-6101(6) 
(2013).  Penile penetration, without the victim’s consent, is necessarily a battery. 
See I.C. § 18-903.  As a result, rape cannot be accomplished without also 
committing a battery with the intent to commit rape.  The only difference between 
battery with the intent to commit rape and rape is that rape requires the penis to 
physically penetrate the victims “oral, anal or vaginal opening,” whereas any 
penile physical contact short of penetration constitutes a battery with the intent to 
commit rape.  It is impossible to commit rape without an unlawful touching or 
other battery.   
This logic is supported by both the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions and 
case law.  Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 970 states: 
Assault with intent to commit rape or battery with intent to commit 
rape is an included offense of rape and can be shown by proof of 
all the elements of rape except penetration.  State v. Bolton, 119 
Idaho 846, 810 P.2d 1132 (Ct. App. 1991); See ICJI 225. 
 
ICJI 970.   
Bolton was charged with rape, but the jury found Bolton guilty of battery 
with intent to commit rape.  Bolton, 119 Idaho at 848, 810 P.2d at 1134.  Bolton 
appealed.  Id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals stated that the issue on appeal was 
“whether battery with intent to commit rape is lesser included offense of forcible 
rape and whether the jury was instructed properly on lesser included offenses.”  
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Id. at 849, 810 P.2d at 1135.  The Court concluded that battery with intent to 
commit rape is an included offense of rape and can be shown by proof of all the 
elements of rape except penetration.  Id. at 850, 810 P.2d at 1136. 
Bolton acknowledges that assault is a lesser included offense of 
battery, the difference being that battery requires an unlawful 
touching. He also acknowledges that assault with intent to commit 
rape is a lesser included offense of rape, and he argues that 
assault with intent to commit rape or battery with intent to commit 
rape can be shown to be a lesser included offense only by proof of 
all the elements of rape, except penetration. See State v. Huggins, 
103 Idaho 422, 648 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App.1982), modified on other 
grounds 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d 1053 (1983). We agree, and we 
hold that there was a reasonable view of the evidence which would 
support the jury’s verdict. 
 
Id.  The Huggins case, cited in Bolton, examined whether, under a prior rape 
statute, the state had to prove that the rapist and victim were not married.  See 
Huggins, 103 Idaho at 425, 648 P.2d at 1138.  Huggins held: 
In Idaho, the crime of “assault with intent to commit rape” (I.C. 
§ 18-907) is a lesser included offense of rape and, in prosecuting 
such an assault, the state must prove all elements of rape except 
penetration. State v. Garney, 45 Idaho 768, 772, 265 P. 668, 669 
(1928); State v. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 548, 90 P. 860, 862 (1907).  
 
Id.  Here, the district court correctly ruled that, based upon the Idaho Criminal 
Jury Instructions and Bolton, battery with intent to commit rape is a lesser include 
offense of a charge of rape.  (5/22/14 Tr., p. 1126, Ls. 2-10; R., pp. 1097-1098.)  
The district court did not err.   
 Battery with the intent to commit rape is also an included offense under 
the “pleading theory.”  The pleading theory holds “‘that an offense is an included 
offense if it is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a means or element of 
the commission of the higher offense.’”  State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529, 261 
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P.3d 519, 523 (2011) (quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211, 731 P.2d 192, 
206 (1986); State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301, 352 P.2d 972, 977 (1960)).  
The information alleged that Gas “did penetrate with his penis the anal opening 
of a female person, [R.G.], who at the time was unconscious of the nature of the 
act and this was known to the defendant.”  (R., pp. 74-75.)  As noted above, a 
penetration by the penis requires a battery and thus battery with the intent to 
commit rape was the means or element necessary to the commission of the 
charged rape.   
On appeal, Gas argues that “battery with intent to commit rape requires a 
battery separate from an act of penetration, and that, for purposes of this 
subsection of the rape statute, the statute does not require a battery.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Gas is incorrect.  Gas bases his argument on the 
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 299 P.3d 219 
(2013).  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Gas’ reliance on Jones is misplaced.  The 
holding in Jones supports a conclusion that battery with the intent to commit rape 
is a lesser included offense of rape under I.C. § 18-6101(6)(2013).   
In Jones, the Idaho Supreme Court examined the elements of “forcible” 
rape:  
The Idaho Code defines forcible rape as follows: 
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the 
oral, anal or vaginal opening with the perpetrator’s penis 
accomplished with a female under any one (1) of the following 
circumstances: 
.... 
(3) Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by 
force or violence. 
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Jones, 154 Idaho at 418, 299 P.3d at 225 (citing I.C. § 18–6101(3)).  The Idaho 
Supreme Court reasoned that the “force or violence” element of forcible rape 
must mean something more than the force inherent in sexual intercourse:  
Were we to construe “force” as encompassing the act of 
penetration itself, it would effectively render the force element 
moot. Force would always be present and never have to be proven, 
so long as there was sexual intercourse. Generally speaking, “it is 
incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will 
not render it a nullity.”  Thus, in order to give full effect to the 
complete text of the statute, we adopt the extrinsic force standard. 
 
Id. at 422, 299 P.3d at 229 (internal citation omitted).  Jones concluded that in 
order to prove the “force or violence” element, the state was required to prove 
“some force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual act.”  Id. at 422, 299 
P.3d at 229.   
 The state agrees that had Gas been charged with “forcible rape” the state 
would have been required to prove some force beyond that which is inherent in 
the sexual act.  But Gas was not charged with “forcible rape.”  Therefore, the 
state was not required to prove any force beyond that which is inherent in the 
sexual act.  In the context of rape, the force which is inherent in the sexual act – 
penile penetration – is necessarily a battery.  As a result, Gas’ reliance on Jones 
is misplaced.   
 Also based on this misplaced belief that penetration with a penis is 
somehow not a battery, Gas also fails to distinguish Bolton.  Gas acknowledges 
that “the Court of Appeals has concluded that battery with the intent to commit 
rape is a lesser included offense of forcible rape.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citing 
State v. Bolton, 119 Idaho 846, 810 P.2d 1132 (Ct. App. 1991).)  He argues, 
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however: “Forcible rape is very different than rape where the alleged victim is 
unconscious of the nature of the act.”  (Id.)  Gas fails to explain why the victim’s 
level of consciousness is even relevant to the analysis, much less show that 
penile penetration with an unconscious victim is not a battery.  Further, while 
Bolton did deal with a “forcible rape” charge, the holding and analysis in Bolton 
were not based on the “force or violence” element.  See Bolton, 119 Idaho at 
849-850, 810 P.2d at 1135-1135.  
 Gas also apparently argues Bolton was wrongly decided because the 
Bolton decision “considered whether the evidence at trial would support the 
determination of whether an offense was a lesser included offense” and “[t]here 
is no theory that permits the court to rely on evidence adduced at trial to 
determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 12-13 (citing State v. Boyenger, 95 Idaho 396, 509 P.2d 1317 (1973) 
(overruled by State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 944 P.2d 119 (1997)).  While the 
Bolton court did cite to the Boyenger decision, its analysis regarding whether 
battery with intent to commit rape was an included offense was based upon the 
statute and the criminal complaint.  See Bolton, 119 Idaho at 849-850, 810 
P. 2d. at 1135-1136.  The Court of Appeals reviewed the battery statute and the 
battery with intent to commit serious felony statute in comparison with the 
complaint and information and held: “Clearly, the state alleged that battery was 
the ‘manner or means’ by which the rape was accomplished.”  Id.  Under the 
“pleading theory” an offense is an included offense if it is “alleged in the 
information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.’”  
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See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529, 261 P.3d at 523.  Therefore, the analysis and 
holding in Bolton is still applicable.   
 Gas further argues that battery with intent to commit rape cannot be an 
offense included in rape, because battery with intent to commit rape is a “specific 
intent crime” and “[r]ape where the victim is alleged to be unconscious of the 
nature of the act is a general intent crime.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)  Gas 
cites no authority for the proposition that a specific intent crime cannot be an 
included offense of a general intent crime.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-14.)  
Neither the “statutory theory” nor the “pleading theory” includes such a 
requirement.  Indeed, to accept Gas’ argument this Court would have to accept 
that attempts cannot be included offenses of completed offenses, because all 
attempts are specific intent crimes.  See e.g. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
401, 3 P.3d 67, 79 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Thus, all attempts are specific intent 
crimes.”) (emphasis original).  To the contrary, as noted above, under both the 
statutory theory and pleading theory, battery with the intent to commit rape is an 
offense included in rape.  Gas has failed to show the district court erred.   
 
2. Instructing The Jury On The Included Offense Of Battery With The 
Intent To Commit Rape Did Not Create A Variance  
 
 Gas argues that instructing the jury on battery with the intent to commit 
rape created an impermissible variance.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.)  Gas 
is incorrect.  The appellate court utilizes a two-step process to determine 
whether there is a fatal variance.  See State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 215, 307 
P.3d 1233, 1241 (Ct. App. 2013).  First, the Court must “determine whether there 
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is a variance between the charging instrument and the instructions presented to 
the jury.”  Id. (citing State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329, 33 P.3d 218, 220 (Ct. 
App. 2001)).  Second, if the Court finds a variance exists, the Court “must 
examine whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the 
conviction.”  Id. (citing Brazil, 136 Idaho at 329, 33 P.3d at 220).  “A variance 
between a charging instrument and a jury instruction necessitates reversal only 
when it deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves him or her 
open to the risk of double jeopardy.”  Id. (citing State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 
417-418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-1190 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330, 33 P.3d at 
221).  Here, Gas’ argument fails at both steps.   
 First, Gas has failed to show a variance between the charging document 
and the instructions presented to the jury.  Gas argues, “Thus, the battery with 
the intent to commit rape instruction varied from the charging document in two 
respects: it 1) allowed the jury to convict Mr. Gas by committing a battery other 
than penetration; and 2) allowed the jury to convict Mr. Gas if this was done 
without R.G.’s consent, not where she was unconscious of the nature of the act.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  As noted in the previous section, Gas is incorrect that 
“unconscious” rape requires “a battery other than penetration.”  (See supra 
§ C(1).)  Gas was charged with penetrating R.G.’s anus with his penis.  This is a 
battery.   
Gas’ next argument – that an allegation of penetrating R.G. while she was 
“unconscious” is different than penetrating R.G. without her consent – also does 
not show a variance.  The district court instructed the jury that to be guilty of 
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battery with the intent to commit rape, that Gas must have “had the intent to use 
such force as was necessary to cause his penis to penetrate, however slightly, 
[R.G.’s] anal opening, without her consent.”  (R., p. 514).  Because it is 
impossible for an unconscious victim to give consent Gas has failed to show any 
variance between the instruction and the charging document. 
 Even if there was a variance, Gas has failed to show that any variance 
rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction.  “A 
variance between a charging instrument and a jury instruction necessitates 
reversal only when it deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves 
him or her open to the risk of double jeopardy.”  Calver 155 Idaho at 215, 307 
P.3d at 1241 (citations omitted).  Gas does not argue he has been left open to 
the risk of double jeopardy.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.)  He only argues 
he was not given proper notice.  Gas argues, “In this case, the charging 
document did not put Mr. Gas on notice that he was required to defend against 
an act other than penetration or that the act was against R.G.’s consent.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)   
Gas was not deprived of the right to fair notice.  In State v. Ormesher, 154 
Idaho 221, 224, 296 P.3d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 2012), the defendant alleged he 
was denied “fair notice” because the charging placed him on notice he had to 
defend against the allegation that he only touched the victim’s breast, but the jury 
instruction required him to defend against an allegation he simply touched the 
victim with the intent to gratify his sexual desire.  The Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument and held that Ormesher was not misled or embarrassed in the 
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preparation of his defense because his defense was not based solely on 
defending against the allegation he only touched the victim’s breasts.  Id. at 224-
225, 296 P.3d at 427-428.  His defense was that he did not kiss or otherwise 
touch any of the victim’s private parts.  Id.  Therefore the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the variance was not fatal because Ormesher’s defense was not 
thwarted by any variance.  Id.   
The same is true here.  Even if there was a variance, Gas’ defense was 
that Gas was not present when R.G. was raped.  (See, e.g., 5/22/14 Tr., p. 1178, 
Ls. 13-15 (“Mr. Gas, Aman did not do what was alleged, because he wasn’t 
there.  And I ask in your deliberations that you return a verdict of not guilty.”).)  
His defense was not that R.G. consented or that he was present but did not 
penetrate R.G’s anus with his penis.  Gas was not misled in the preparation of 
his defense because his defense was that he was not present during the rape.  




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Gas guilty of battery with the intent to commit rape.   
 DATED this 8th day of August, 2016. 
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